■ المغرب في لقاء مع الإصلاح الديمقراطي: تقييــم

المؤسسة الدولية للديمقراطية والأنتخابات

By Tayuh Ngenge

In the preceding nine months, a revolutionary wind of change has engulfed North Africa and the Middle East. It brought with it unprecedented consequences on the long established political regimes of the region. In Tunisia, where the Arab Spring – as the phenomenon has been called – originated, the 23-year rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali suddenly ended on January 14, when the latter fled the country as the situation spiraled out of control. On February 11, it was the turn of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak to go, after 30 years in power; and later in August, Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi, after a 42-year rule. In Syria and Yemen, the regimes of Bashar Al Assad and Abdullah Saleh are still locked in a standoff with revolutionaries, demanding not only reforms but regime change. In Morocco – a hereditary monarchy, authorities were able to avert the departure of long-serving rulers witnessed in other countries across the region by placating protesters with a new constitution. How and why was this possible? What does the new constitution mean for Moroccans? To what extent is it likely to change the future of Moroccan politics?

Surviving the domino effect

Some observers have attempted to account for Morocco’s success in managing the popular protests by pointing to Mohammed VI’s proactive response with proposals for constitutional reforms, rather than crackdown on protesters, as others did. While one cannot discount this, such an explanation, nevertheless, appears to be overly simplistic, considering that similar proactive measures taken in Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, yielded different outcomes. A more sociological analysis may be needed to explain this variation. Although a predominantly Berber country, Morocco is, in fact, a land of divided and distinct Berber tribes - the Shilhah, Zayanes and the Riffian Berbers - all with a long history of tension and conflict amongst them. In this context, the monarchy has emerged, over the years, to become not only an embodiment of Moroccan culture but also a unifying factor and symbol of stability, commanding great popular appeal. It is therefore unsurprising that Moroccan protesters - unlike in Egypt and other places - took a less radical approach, demanding reforms more on the role of the monarchy in the business of government, rather than outright regime change. In fact, numerous conversations with Moroccans during a trip to Rabat in February 2011, even before protests spread to the country, seem to support this thesis. Most locals appeared to agree that though current leadership was far from perfect, Mohammed VI - unlike, Gadaffi, Mubarak and Ben Ali - was not a detested figure nor was he considered an irrelevant symbol of a despised history. Others absolved the monarchy of any responsibility, directing their anger and blame, instead, at the government. This also perhaps explains why the February 20^th Movement, which championed the protests, was unable to garner the kind of critical mass necessary to generate a revolution of profound changes.

Secondly, the Moroccan monarchy- as one observer has argued – has as history of being, relatively, reformist and flexible, despite centralizing political power. Instances of this include the hitherto autocratic King Hassan II’s decision in the 1990s to relax human rights restrictions and release political prisoners. He later introduced the policy of “alternance” which brought the opposition to power for the first time in the Arab world. Morocco also ratified many international human rights conventions during this time and the King set up the Royal Council for Human Rights to investigate abuses by the state. Mohammed VI allowed the continuation of these investigations when he succeeded Hassan II, with the state later issuing an acknowledgement and denunciation of its past gross human rights abuses. It is therefore likely that, the proposed constitutional reforms (and its subsequent high approval rate), were perceived as a continuation, by the monarchy, of the policy of openness and responsiveness, to demands for reform, that it has often shown in the past. How far do the new reforms go?

The new constitution

Although one may criticize the new constitution for not being a people-driven process (the substance, scope and guidelines for the constitutional reform process having being unilaterally decided by the monarchy), Mohammed VI’s very move to swiftly and successfully implement these reforms - and thereby averting the worst effects of the Arab Spring must - be hailed as an act of political craftsmanship. Approved by 98.5% with a turnout of 78% of registered voters (according to reported government sources), in a referendum on July 1, the constitution has also been challenged for not going far enough substantively. As lucidly argued by one analyst, the King’s executive powers -a key issue for the liberals - remain largely intact. These include, but are not limited to, naming the Prime Minister and approving the cabinet over which he presides(articles 47 and 48); commanding the military (article 53); chairing the various high councils on religion, security and the judiciary (Articles 41, 54, 56); naming ambassadors (article 55); approving the nomination of judges by the Supreme Council for Magistrates , over which he presides (article 57); pronouncing all enacted laws (article 50); dismissing the government and dissolving parliament(articles 47 and 51).

Yet, dismissing the new constitution as only paying lip service to protesters would be denying some significant improvements in the new framework. To be fair, one must look at these reforms in the context of some of the socio-economic and political grievances tabled by protesters, for – as argued rightly by others – the new constitution does contain some far-reaching, even if not revolutionary, revisions. For instance, an important demand of protesters was the need to construct a more socially and economically inclusive society. The constitution, unlike its predecessor, goes further- in terms of gender- in explicitly granting not only political rights but also, social, cultural and economic rights to women on the same level as men (article 19). Considering that the question of women’s rights and gender equality in Morocco, as elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world, has for long been dictated by cultural and religious norms, this provision can be seen as a significant step towards advancing women’s rights, promoting gender balance, and, recognising and expanding the role of women in society in Moroccan society. Second, while the constitution does little in terms of defusing the political powers of the King, it does make provision for decentralization and local government and autonomy (articles 1, 136, 137, 141,142), which is a novelty in the territorial and political organisation of the country. Third, protests in Morocco, as in other places affected by the Arab Spring, were driven by a largely youthful population frustrated by the effects of long term state corruption and their marginalisation from the political, economic and cultural life of the country. The new charter tries to address this problem through the establishment of two key institutions-the National Instance for Probity and the fight against corruption (article 36) and the Consultative Council on Youth and Associative Action (article 33). The latter has the mandate to facilitate the integration of young men and women in the political, economic, social and cultural development of the country.

Will these change the future of Moroccan Politics?

Only the future, of course, holds the answer to this question. There is more to be done beyond the constitutional text. A good number of the provisions - such as the ones on decentralization are not self-implementing and will need not only subsidiary legislation, but also unreserved political commitment from the regime, for any meaningful change to happen. This is, more often than not, the greatest challenge, where the lack of political will becomes the key obstacle to translating general principles into concrete legislative and real action. Whether or not Morocco’s political class will be able to move beyond the constitutional rhetoric to building a true and sustainable culture of constitutionalism out of the huge mandate given them by voters during the July 1 referendum remains the open question. If anything is certain, it is the fact that the new constitution  has, for now, saved the monarchy and the regime from the Arab Spring, while leaving Moroccans to hope and believe - even if fleetingly – that the  new constitution will, indeed,  bring a different and better future.

Sources:

• “Constitution Marocain: ce qui va changer ” Jeune Afrique, No. 2633(June 2011)
• Paul Silverstein, “ Weighing Morocco’s New Constitution ” (July 5 2011) Available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070511
• Marina Ottaway, “The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same” Carnegie (June 2011). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/new-moroccan-constitution-real-change-or-more-of-same/6g
•  Max Fisher. “Will Morocco be the Arab Spring’s Great Success-or Great Failure” The Atlantic(July 2011). Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/will-morocco-be-the-arab-springs-great-success-or-great-failure/241286/
• Jonathan Power, “The ‘Arab Spring’ – is Morocco ahead of the pack?” The Citizen(August 2011)Available at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/editorial-analysis/20-analysis-opinions/13385-the-arab-spring--is-morocco-ahead-of-the-pack.html