Stefan Voigt

Job Title

Director,
Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg, Germany

Organization

Hamburg University

Country

Germany

Area of Expertise

  • Conflict
  • Gender and constitutions
  • Diversity
  • Customary governance/legal pluralism
  • Human rights
  • Judicial system design
  • Minority issues
  • Participation
  • Power sharing (horizontal/vertical)
  • Religion
  • Security sector

Publications

Stefan Voigt

List of Publications
Monographs

(together with André Schmidt), Making European Merger Policy More Predictable, Heidelberg et al.: Springer, 2005.

Institutionenökonomik („Institutional Economics“), Neue Ökonomische Bibliothek, UTB: Fink Verlag, München, 2002 (2nd edition 2009; translations into Czech 2008 [“Institucionální ekonomie”], Russian and Chinese under way).

(together with Thoralf Erb, Jochen Jahraus, Uwe Mummert and Axel Schulz:) Konsequenzen der Globalisierung für die Wettbewerbspolitik ("Consequences of Globalization for Antitrust Policy"), Frankfurt et al., Peter Lang, 2000.

Explaining Constitutional Change - A Positive Economics Approach, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1999.

Die Welthandelsordnung zwischen Konflikt und Stabilität - Konfliktpotentiale und Konfliktlösungsmechanismen ("The World Trade Order Between Conflict and Stability - Conflict Potential and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms"), Freiburg: Haufe, 1992.

Editor of edited volumes

(together with Eli Salzberger); The Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings; Special symposium issue of Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 20, 3-4 (2009).

(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen); Scientific Competition, Conferences on New Political Economy, Vol. 25, 2008.

(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen); The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law, Conferences on New Political Economy, Vol. 24, 2007.

(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen) International Conflict Resolution, Conferences on New Political Economy, vol. 23, 2005.

Constitutional Political Economy, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003.

(together with H.-J. Wagener:) Constitutions, Markets and Law – Recent Experiences in Transition Economies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002.

(together with Manfred E. Streit:) Europa reformieren - Vorschläge von Ökonomen und Juristen zur zukünftigen Verfaßtheit Europas ("Reforming Europe - Proposals from Economists and Lawyers concerning the Future Constitution of Europe"), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996.

Papers in Journals
(64) (together with Axel Dreher) “Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers.” Forthcoming in Journal of Comparative Economics.
(63) (together with Lorenz Blume) “Federalism and decentralization – a critical survey of frequently used indicators.” Forthcoming in Constitutional Political Economy.
(62) (together with Lorenz Blume) “The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization: A cross-country assessment.” Forthcoming in Public Choice.
(61) (together with Bernd Hayo) “Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?”, Journal of Comparative Economics 38(3):283-305 (2010).
(60) (together with Lorenz Blume) “Does Organizational Design of Supreme Audit Institutions Matter? A Cross Country Assessment“, forthcoming in: European Journal of Political Economy (2010).
(59) Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments, Public Choice 146(1-2):205-256 (2011).
(58) (together with Anne van Aaken and Lars Feld) “Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? – An Empirical Evaluation Across 78 Countries, American Law and Economics Review 12:204-244 (2010).
(57) “The Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross Country Analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy 25(3):327-339 (2009).
(56) (together with Lorenz Blume and Jens Müller) “The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment”, Public Choice 140:431-61 (2009).
(55) (together with Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Carten Wolf); The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini, Public Choice 139:197-225 (2009).
(54) “Explaining Constitutional Garrulity”, forthcoming in: International Review of Law and Economics, 2009.
(53) (together with Lorenz Blume and Thomas Döring): „Fiskalische Effekte der Kommunalverfassungsreformen der 1990er Jahre in Deutschland”, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 228(4):317-344 (2008).
(52) “The Effects of Competition Policy on Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators”, Journal of Development Studies 45(8):1225-1248 (2009).
(51) (together with Anne van Aaken) “Verhaltenspflichten für Parlamentarier und ihre Folgen“ (“Individual Disclosure Rules for Parliamentarians and their Consequences”, in: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Deutsches und Europäisches Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung (MIP) 2007, Vol. 13, available at: http://www.pruf.de. A revised version as “Der „gläserne“ Abgeordnete? Transparenzregeln für Parlamentarier und ihre Folgen, Journal für Rechtspolitik 16(3):169 - 176 (2008).
(50) (together with Bernd Hayo) “Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 164(4), 751—777 (2008).
(49) “The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability – Cross-Country Evidence”, European Journal of Law and Economics 25(2):95-123 (2008).
(48) “Are International Merchants Stupid? - A Natural Experiment Refutes the Legal Origin Theory”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 5(1):1-20 (2008).
(47) (together with Lorenz Blume) “The Economic Effects of Human Rights”, Kyklos 60(4):509-38 (2007).
(46) (together with Bernd Hayo) “Explaining de facto judicial independence”, International Review of Law and Economics 27(3):269-90 (2007).
(45) (together with Lorenz Blume) “Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält” (When Justitia asks for a little extra-money), Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 8(1):65-92 (2007).
(44) (together with Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume) “Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence – the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Journal of Development Economics 82:348-73 (2007).
(43) (together with Thomas Döring): Reforming Federalism German Style – More than a Minor Face Lift? Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy 41(4): 201-8 (2006).
(42) Robust Political Economy: The Case of Antitrust, Review of Austrian Economics 19 (2/3):203-15 (June 2006).
(41) (together with André Schmidt): Der „more economic approach“ in der Missbrauchsaufsicht: Einige kritische Anmerkungen zu den Vorschlägen der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb („The more economic approach in Antitrust: Some Critical Remarks on the Commission’s Proposals”), in: Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2006
(40) (together with André Schmidt): Die prozeduralen Aspekte der Fusionskontrolle – die vergessene Seite der Reform („The Procedural Aspects of European Merger Control – the Forgotten Side of the Reform“), in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 56(2):164-84.
(39) Crisis – What Crisis? After the Failure of the Draft Constitution, Europe Needs Thorough Discusssions – and a New Focus on Integration, Intereconomics 40(4):196-200 (2005)
(38) (together with Roland Kirstein): The Violent and the Weak – When Dictators Care About Social Contracts; American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 65(4): 863-90 (2006)
(37) Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society, The Independent Review, 10(1): 59-82, 2005.
(36) (together with André Schmidt): “Switching to Substantial Impediments of Competition (SIC) can have Substantial Costs – SIC!”, European Competition Law Review, 2004 (25(9):584-89).
(35) (together with André Schmidt): “The Commission’s Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers: Improvement or Deterioration?” Common Market Law Review 2004 (41(6):1583-94).
(34) The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice – Towards A Comparative Analysis, forthcoming in: Rechtstheorie, 2005.
(33) (together with Anne van Aaken and Eli Salzberger): The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework, Constitutional Political Economy 15: 261-80 (2004).
(32) Iudex Calculat: The ECJ’s Quest for Power, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 22:77-101 (2003).
(31) Towards Ever More Confusion? The Convention’s Proposal for a European Constitution, Intereconomics 38(4):185-8 (2003).
(30) (together with André Schmidt): Mehr Rechtssicherheit in der Europäischen Fusionskontrolle? („Improved Predictability in European Merger Control?“), Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 9:897-906 (2003).
(29) (together with Lars Feld): Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, European Journal of Political Economy 19(3):497-527 (2003).
(28) Die unabhängige Justiz – eine vernachlässigte Determinante zur Erklärung der Zentralbankunabhängigkeit? („The Independent Judiciary – A Neglected Variable for Explaining Central Bank Independence?”); Schmollers Jahrbuch 122(2):207-25 (2002).
(27) (together with Eli Salzberger): Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, Kyklos 55(2):247-68 (2002).
(26) (together with Eli Salzberger): On the Delegation of Powers – with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe and Israel, Theoretical Inquiries into Law 3(1): 207-63 (2002).
(25) (together with Eli Salzberger): On the Delegation of Powers – with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe, Constitutional Political Economy 13(1):25-52; (2002).
An abridged German version in: Nutzinger, H.G. (Hrsg.): Verteilungsprobleme im Transformationsprozeß, Duncker & Humblot, 2001:9-42.
(24) (with Gert G. Wagner): Zur Reform der Altersvorsorge – ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag („Reforming Old Age Pension Systems – A Proposal Based On Constitutional Economics“), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 49:235-49 (2000).
(23) „Fusionen und Globalisierung – Einige Notizen zur Genese von Wettbewerbsregeln“ („Mergers and Globalisation – Some Notes on Generating Competition Rules“), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 49(2) (2000): 158-68.
(22) “Freiwilligkeit durch Zwangsandrohung – eine institutionenökonomische Analyse von Selbstverpflichtungserklärungen in der Umweltpolitik“ („Voluntariness by threatening compulsion – using institutional economics to analyze voluntary pollution constraints in environmental policy“); Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht, 3/2000:393-408.
(21) "Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions", Constitutional Political Economy, 10(3): 283-300 (1999).
(20) "Implicit Constitutional Change - Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document", European Journal of Law and Economics, 7(1999): 197-224.
(19) "Making Constitutions Work - Conditions for Maintaining the Rule of Law", Cato Journal, 8(2) (1998): 191-208.
(18) "Methodische Konzepte zur Reform sozialer Sicherungssysteme - einige Überlegungen aus konstitutionenökonomischer Sicht" („Reforming Social Security Systems - Some Considerations from Constitutional Economics"), Zeitschrift für internationales und ausländisches Sozialrecht, 12 (1998):53-66.
(17) (together with Daniel Kiwit): "Grenzen des institutionellen Wettbewerbs" ("Limits to Institutional Competition"), Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 17 (1998):313-37.
(16) (together with M.E. Streit): "Toward Ever Closer Union - Or Ever Larger? Or Both? Entry to the European Union from the Perspective of Constitutional Economics", an abridged version in International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (1996):385-8.
Complete version in Dieter Schmidtchen und Robert Cooter (Eds.): Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union, Cheltenham: Elgar, 1997, 223-47.
(15) "Positive Constitutional Economics - A Survey", Public Choice, 90: 11-53.
Reprinted in: Charles K. Rowley (Ed.): Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective, Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1997, 11-53.
(14) "Pure Eclecticism - The Tool Kit of the Constitutional Economist", Constitutional Political Economy, 7 (1996):177-96.
(13) "Kompensationgeschäfte - zurück zum Naturaltausch?" (Countertrade - Back to Primitive Barter?), wisu 25 (1996):34-36.
(12) (together with Daniel Kiwit:) "Überlegungen zum institutionellen Wandel unter Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses interner und externer Institutionen" ("Considerations on Institutional Change taking into account the Relationship between External and Internal Institutions"), ORDO, 46 (1995):117-48.
(11) "Die kontraktorientierte Theorie der Verfassung - Anmerkungen zum Ansatz Buchanans" ("Social Contract Based Constitutional Economics - Some Remarks on Buchanan"), Homo Oeconomicus, XI (1994):173-209.
(10) "European Political Union - An Appropriate Example for Applying Constitutional Economics to Real-Life Problems? - A Note on an Article by James M. Buchanan", ORDO, 45 (1994):273-86.
(9) "Values, Norms, Institutions, and the Prospects for Economic Growth in Central and Eastern Europe", Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 4 (1993):495-529.
reprinted in Czech as: "Hodnoty a perspectivy hospodárského rustu ve strední a východní Evrope", Politická Ekonomie, 94 (1994):733-746.
also appeared in: E. Jahn und R. Wildenmann (Eds.): Stability in East Central Europe?, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995, 175-207.
(8) "Strategische Allianzen - Modisches Schlagwort oder Antwort auf globale Herausforderungen?" ("Strategic Alliances - Fashionable Catch-Phrase or Answer to Global Challenges?"), WiSt, 22 (1993):246-249.
(7) "Die Non Dilemma-These" ("The Non-Dilemma Hypothesis") WiSt, 21 (1992):516- 519.
(6) "Das Lizenzauktionsverfahren: Ein zielkonformes Instrument zur Regulierung lokaler Kabelfernsehstationen? - Eine Analyse der anglo-amerikanischen Diskussion und Praxis" ("Bidding for Franchise Monopoly - An Analysis of the Discussion and Policies Concerning the Regulation of Local Cable Television Stations in England and the U.S."), communications - The European Journal of Communication, 17 (1992):67-90.
(5) "GATT - Institution der Welthandelsordnung" ("GATT - Institution of the World Order"), WiSt, 21 (1992):32-34.
(4) (together with M.E. Streit:) "Die Handelspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft aus weltwirtschaftlicher Perspektive" ("The Trade Policy of the European Community from a Global Perspective"), Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftspolitik, 36 (1991):193-219;
Also in: R. Wildenmann (Ed.); Staatswerdung Europas? - Optionen für eine Europäische Union, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991, 167-98;
Reprinted in: Manfred E. Streit: Freiburger Beiträge zur Ordnungsökonomik, Mohr (Siebeck): Tübingen, 1995, 267-96.
(3) "Traded Services in the GATT - What's all the Fuss About?", Intereconomics, 26 (1991):177-186.
(2) "Die evolutionsorientierte Theorie der Verfassung - Bemerkungen zum Ansatz von Hayeks", Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 40 (1991):93-107.
Reprinted in English translation as: "On the Internal Consistency of Hayek's Evolutionary oriented Constitutional Economics - Some General Remarks", Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 3 (1993):461-476.
(1) "Defects of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism", Intereconomics, 25 (1990):147-8.

Contributions to edited volumes and encyclopediae:

(37) “Von Euckens Ordnungspolitik zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik”; in: Festschrift für Peter Behrens, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck); to appear in 2011.
(36) „Bargaining for Constitutional Change – Toward an Economic Theory of Constitutional Change“, in: M. Cano del Valle et al. (eds.): Teoría de Juegos y Derecho Contemporáneo, Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 57-83.
(35) “Die Situation der EU-Verfassung ist verfahren – Ausweg durch Verfahren?” in: M.T. Voigt et al. (eds.): Bedingungen europäischer Solidarität, Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang, S. 121-130.
(34) „Constitutional Political Economy – Analyzing the most basic layer of formal institutions”, in: Brousseau, E. and J.-M. Glachant (eds.): Guidebook to the New Institutional Economics, Cambridge: CUP 2008, chapter 17.
(33) “Thirty years on: Tullock, The Vote Motive and Public Choice”, in: Tullock, Gordon (2006); The Vote Motive – Edited and with an introduction by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, pp. 117-30.
A Korean version appeared in 2009 with Kyungsung University Press.
(32) „Economic Analysis of Constitutions“in: David S. Clark (ed.): Encyclopedia of Law and Society, 2007.
(31) (together with Lars Feld) “Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary, R. Congleton and B. Swedenborg (eds.): Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy - Analysis and Evidence, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, pp.251-88.
(30) “Judicial Independence as a Necessary Component of the Rule of Law – Preliminary Insights and Economic Consequences”, in: A. Marciano and J.-M. Josselin (eds.): Law and the State. A Political Economy Approach, Cheltenham et al.: Elgar, 2005, 242-68.
(29) „On the Coexistence of Different Property Rights Systems – and Their Consequences for Economic Growth and Development”, in: E. Colombatto (ed.): Edward Elgar Companion on Property Rights; Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 154-76, 2004.
(28) The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice – Towards A Comparative Analysis, in: Aaken, List, Luetge (eds.): Deliberation and Decision, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, pp.199-229,
(27) „Versprechen glaubhaft machen – 2 neue Indikatoren zur Messung von Justizunabhängigkeit“ („Making Promises Credible – 2 New Indicators for Measuring Judicial Independence“), in: Th. Eger (Hrsg.): Institutionen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003.
(26) The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice – Towards A Comparative Analysis, in: Aaken, A.V., Chr. List and Chr. Lütge (eds.): Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory, and Deliberative Democracy, Aldeshot: Ashgate; 2003.
(25) “The Bonds of Democratic Politics – An Economic Perspective” in: Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe (eds.): Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics, to appear in 2003 with Cambridge University Press.
A smilar version appeared in: Wolf Lepenies (ed.): Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals – Centers and Peripheries in a Changing World, Frankfurt: Campus, pp. 57-84.
(24) „Do We Need a New International Financial Architecture? Many Questions and Some Preliminary Policy Advice“, in: Marauhn, Th. und R. Grote (Hrsg.): On the Regulation of International Financial Markets in the Age of Liberalisation and Free Movement of Capital, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2003.
(23) Entries „Positive Constitutional Political Economy“ and „Dictators and Social Contracts“ in: Rowley, Ch. and Schneider, F. (eds.): Encyclopedia of Public Choice, forthcoming with Kluwer 2003.
(22) Entry „Constitutional Law“, forthcoming in: Hatzis, A. (ed.): Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2003.
(21) (together with Hella Engerer:) „Institutionen und Transformation – Mögliche Politikimplikationen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik“, in: K. Zimmermann (Hrsg.): Neue Entwicklungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Heidelberg et al.: Physica, 2001, pp. 149-215.
An English Version appeared under the title „Institutions and Transition – Possible Policy Implications of the New Institutional Economics“ in: K. Zimmermann (ed.); Frontiers in Economics, Heidelberg et al.: Springer 2002 (pp. 127-84).
(20) „Das Konzept der nationalstaatlichen Souveränität und die Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik“ („The Concept of Nation-State Sovereignty and the Theory of Economic Policy“) to appear in: H. Berg (ed.); Neuere Entwicklungen in der Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
(19) “Das Verhältnis von Staat und Gesellschaft bei Friedrich A. von Hayek – ein Vorschlag zur Weiterentwicklung“ („The relationship between state and society in Hayek – a proposal for further development“), in: H. Leipold und I. Pies (Hrsg.): Zur Konzeption von Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik: Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungsperspektiven, Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius.
(18) „What Constitution for Europe? The Constitutional Question from the Point of View of (Positive) Constitutional Economics, to appear in: Th. Bruha (Hrsg.): What Constitution for Europe? Baden-Baden: Nomos.
(17) „Konstitutionellen Wandel erklären – zur Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft als Determinante der Verfassungswirklichkeit“ („Explaining Constitutional Change – the Role of Civil Society as a determinant of constitutional Reality“), in: J. Nautz (ed.); Das Rechtssystem zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft - Zur Rolle gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung und vorstaatlicher Schlichtung, Wien: Passagen Verlag 2001:67-79.
A slightly modified version to appear in Bulgarian in: Ivan Krastev (ed.); Footnotes – Social Sciences and the Other Century, Sofia 2000:181-204.
(16) Entry „Ordnungsökonomik“ („Economics of Order“) in Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon (15th edition), Wiesbaden 2000.
(15) Entry „Wirtschaftsforschung“ („Economic Research“) in Evangelisches Soziallexikon, Stuttgart 2000.
(14) "Marktwirtschaftlicher Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren" („Market Competition as a Discovery Procedure“), in: G. Papke (Hrsg.): Wissen, Freiheit und Ordnung - Friedrich August von Hayek, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, erscheint Anfang 2000 (translations into English and Chinese being prepared).
(13) "Wirtschaftliche Freiheitsrechte, Ressourcenverteilung und Wirtschaftswachstum: Zum heuristischen Potential des Vergleichs von Wirtschaftssystemen" ("Economic Freedom, Resource Endowment and Economic Growth: on the Heuristic Potential of Comparing Economic Systems"), in: Dieter Cassel (ed.): Perspektiven der Systemforschung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999:271-97.
(12) Entry "Transformation in Osteuropa" ("Transition in Central and Eastern Europe") in: Herrmann-Pillath, C. and M. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (eds.): Handbuch Evolutorische Ökonomik, vol. 2: Evolutorische Ökonomik in der Anwendung, Berlin et al.: Springer.
(11) Entry "Constitutional Law" in Boudewijn Bouckaert und Gerrit de Geest (Eds.): Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, Cheltenham: Elgar, to appear in 1999.
(10) (together with Daniel Kiwit): "The Role and Evolution of Beliefs, Habits, Moral Norms, and Institutions", to appear in: Herbert Giersch (Ed.): The Merits of Markets - Critical Issues of the Open Society, Berlin et al.: Springer, 1998: 83-108.
(9) "Das Forschungsprogramm der Positiven Konstitutionenökonomik" ("The Research Program of Positive Constitutional Economics") in: Gerd Grözinger and Stephan Panther (eds.): Unsere Konstitution in guter Form und Verfassung? Marburg: Metropolis; 1998:279-319.
(8) "Kants Gerechtigkeitskriterien, die Wirtschaftstheorie und die ökonomischen Transformationsprozesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa" ("Kant's Criteria of Justice, Economic Theory, and the Transition Processes of Central and Eastern European Economies"), in: K. Dicke/K.-M. Kodalle (Eds.): Republik und Weltbürgerrecht, Weimar/Köln: Böhlau, 1998, 399-434.
(7) Entry "Spontane Ordnung" ("Spontaneous Order") in: Gabler Volkswirtschaftslexikon, Band 2, Wiesbaden: Gabler 1996, 998-1000.
slightly abridged version in: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, Band 4, Wiesbaden: Gabler 1996 (14. Auflage), 3524f.
(6) Entry "Konstitutionenökonomik" ("Constitutional Economics") in: Gabler Volkswirtschaftslexikon, Band 1, Wiesbaden: Gabler 1996, 621-9.
slightly abridged version in: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, Band 2, Wiesbaden: Gabler 1996 (14. Auflage), 2213-18.
(5) "Die konstitutionelle Ökonomik als Herausforderung für die Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik - zugleich eine Skizze zur Weiterentwicklung einer ökonomischen Theorie der Verfassung" ("Constitutional Economics as a Challenge to the Theory of Economic Policy - Also a Sketch of How to Develop an Economic Theory of Constitutions"), in: Ingo Pies und Martin Leschke (Eds.): James Buchanans konstitutionelle Ökonomik, Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr (Siebeck), 1996, 157-83.
(4) "Der Weg zur Freiheit - Mögliche Implikationen Hayekscher Hypothesen für die Transformation der Wirtschaftssysteme Mittel- und Osteuropas" ("The Road to Freedom - Possible Implications of Hayekian Hypotheses for the Transition of Central and Eastern Europe's Economic Systems"), in: Hölscher, J.; A. Jacobsen, H. Tomann, H. Weisfeld (Eds.): Bedingungen ökonomischer Entwicklung in Zentralosteuropa, Vol.2: Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Systemwandel, Marburg: Metropolis, 1994,63-105.
(3) (together with M.E. Streit:) "The Economics of Conflict Resolution in International Trade", in: Friedmann, D. und E.J. Mestmäcker (Eds.); Conflict Resolution in International Trade, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, 39-77.
reprinted in German as "Die Ökonomik der Konfliktlösung im internationalen Handel" in Manfred E. Streit: Freiburger Beiträge zur Ordnungsökonomik, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck)1995, 225-63.
(2) "Wirtschaftspolitischer Handlungsbedarf auf internationaler Ebene als Reaktion auf strategische Allianzen" ("Policy Implications on the International level as a Reaction to Strategic Alliances"), in: Prosi, G. und Ch. Watrin (Eds.); Dynamik des Weltmarktes - Schlankheitskur für den Staat? Veröf¬fentlichungen der Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung, Band 37, Köln: Bachem, 1993, 141-7.
(1) "Strategische Allianzen - ein Kartell der Konzerne gegen die Konsumenten dieser Welt? Zur Frage, ob grenzüberschreitende Unternehmenskooperationen wettbewerbspolitischen Handlungsbedarf auslösen" ("Strategic Alliances - Triggering the Necessity of International Antitrust Policy?"), in: Hanns Martin Schleyer Stiftung (Ed.); Dynamik des Weltmarktes - Schlankheitskur für den Staat? - Forschungsergebnisse im Überblick, Köln, (1992) 226-227.

Discusssion Papers (mostly under review):

(11) “Empirical Constitutional Economics: Onward and Upward.” Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773448.
(10) (with Bernd Hayo) “Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t.” available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695147.
(9) (with Bernd Hayo) “Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence: A Global Survey; available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1724696
(8) “How to Measure the Rule of Law”; available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420287.
(7) “Explaining Institutional Change”; Invited lecture at Workshop on the “Dynamics of Institutions”, Paris, October 2008.
(6) “How (Not) to Measure Institutions”, Invited lecture at World Bank Workshop on “Effectiveness of Governance”, May 2008.
(5) “Does ADR Blossom when State Courts are Bad? March 2008 (presented at annual meeting of European Public Choice Society, annual meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, Haifa 2008)
(4) (together with Anne van Aaken); Do Individual Disclosure Rules for Parliamentarians Improve Political Outcomes?; presented at EALE Copenhagen September 2007
(3) (together with Bernd Hayo); The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth, CESifo Working Paper 2514, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1318292 (presented at AEA 2007, EALE 2007, EPCS 2008).
(2) (together with Lars Feld). “Unbundling Judicial Independence”, mimeo: Universities of Heidelberg and Marburg, March 2007 (presented at ISNIE 2007)
(1) “The Interplay Between National and International Law – Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators”, December 2005.

Miscellaneous:

(19) “The Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes--Oxley Act: Comment", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 167(1), 165--167 (2011).
(18) “When are judges likely to be corrupt?” in: Transparency International – Global Corruption Report 2007, Cambridge: CUP.
(17) “Economic Growth, certainty in the law and judicial independence”, in: Transparency International – Global Corruption Report 2007, Cambridge: CUP.
(16) Comment on “Judicial Reform in Developing Economies: Opportunities and Constraints…” in: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington, D.C. 2007).
(16) (together with Lorenz Blume): Case Study on Germany for an OECD Project on Contracts between Levels of Government (GOV/TDPC (2006) 18).
(15) (together with Lars Feld): How Does Judicial Independence Affect the Investment Climate? In: Kochendörfer-Lucius and B. Pleskovic (eds.): Investment Climate, Growth, and Poverty, Washington: The World Bank; pp. 53-61 (2005).
(14) Review of Market-Augmenting Government – The Institutional Foundations for Prosperity, Edited by Omar Azfar & Charles A. Cadwell, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, The Journal of Economic Literature, XLII(4):1138f. (2004).
(13) Review of Patricia Dillon and Frank C. Wykoff (2002); Creating Capitalism – Transitions and Growth in Post-Soviet Europe, Cheltenham et al.: Edward Elgar, in: The Economic Journal, electronic version 2003.
(12) Comment on Ekatarina Zhuravskaya ("Market-Hampering Federalism: Local Incentives for Reform in Russia"), in : J.-J. Dethier (ed.): Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 2000, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 171-76.
(11) Review of Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman (eds.): Economics, Values, and Organization, Cambridge University Press 1998, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(2):358-60 (1999).
(10) Review of James M. Buchanan, Post-Socialist Political Economy - Selected Essays, Edward Elgar 1997, Constitutional Political Economy 10(1999):111-3.
(9) Review of Branko Milanovíc; Income, inequality, and poverty during the transition from planned to market economy, The World Bank 1998, European Journal of Political Economy 14(1998):801-2.
(8) Comment on Ulrich Druwe ("Die Umsetzung ordnungsethischer Erkenntnisse in der Politik"): "Optimismus allein genügt nicht - die Umsetzung ordnungstheoretischer Erkenntnisse setzt deren Existenz voraus", in: D. Aufderheide und M. Dabrowski (eds.); Wirtschaftsethik und Moralökonomik: Normen, soziale Ordnung und der Beitrag der Ökonomik, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997, 311-15
(7) Review of Avinash K. Dixit; The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective, The MIT Press 1996 (Munich Lectures in Economics; Center for Economic Studies), European Journal of Political Economy, 13:389-92
(6) Comment on Keith Cowling und Roger Sugden ("Beyond Capitalism and State Socialism"), in: Hölscher, J., A. Jacobsen, H. Tomann, H. Weisfeld (Eds.): Bedingungen ökonomischer Entwicklung in Zentralosteuropa, Vol.5: Marburg: Metropolis, 1996, 173-178
(5) Review of Blommestein, Hendrikus J. and Bernard Steunenberg (Ed.): Government and Markets - Establishing a Democratic Constitutional Order and a Market Economy in Former Socialist Countries, Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994, European Journal of Political Economy, 12 (1996): 165-8
(4) Review of Lothar Elsner; Wirtschaftliche Ungerechtigkeit als Anfrage an Markttheorie und methodistische Wirtschaftsethik, Theologie für die Praxis, 21 (1995):47-50
(3) Review of Ingo Pies; Normative Institutionenökonomik, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,151 (1994):412-415
reprinted in Spanish translation in Dialogo Cientifico, 5 (1996):83-6
(2) Review of Adam Przeworski; Democracy and the market, Constitutional Political Economy, 4 (1993):295-298
(1) Review of Dieter Helm (Ed.); The Economic Borders of the State, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 209 (1992):562-564

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